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Provider plurality and 
supply-side reform
Rod Sheaff and Pauline Allen
Polymorphous plural providers
Not only healthcare financing but also its provision was nationalised 
when the NHS was founded. Besides guaranteeing access to healthcare, 
Bevan and the other founders also intended to – and eventually 
largely did – ‘ level up’ a supply side comprised of diversely-owned 
providers which provided correspondingly diverse levels of service 
access, quality and responsiveness to healthcare needs. Since 1979 neo-
liberal ‘reforms’ of the NHS have had a supply side component, that 
of introducing ‘provider plurality’ under which a range of differently-
owned organisations provide NHS-funded services:
1. public firms, that is, state-owned providers (for example, NHS 
trusts) with a degree of financial autonomy and discretion in their 
use of resources.
2. professional partnerships (for example, most general practices), 
which a group of professionals jointly own and manage, and which 
employ other staff.
3. Shareholder-owned, dividend-maximising firms including:
a) private equity firms, whose shares are not publicly traded.
b) Corporations, whose shares are publicly traded.
4. proprietary (that is, owner-managed firms), whose shares are not 
usually publicly traded.
5. social enterprises, an ill-defined category ranging from not-for-
profit providers which differ from corporations mainly in not 
distributing profits to shareholders to organisations whose workforce 
and/or consumers have a voice in controlling the organisation 
(Allen et al, 2011).
6. charitable, voluntary and self-help organisations which depend 
heavily on volunteer labour.
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7. co-operatives and mutuals, democratically controlled by their 
workforce, consumers or subscribers.
In the circumstances that most NHS services have hitherto been 
provided by public organisations and professional partnerships, 
proposals for greater provider diversity mean shifting the proportion 
towards types (3) to (7) above. Whatever the effect on healthcare supply, 
such a contentious policy has already greatly increased the supply of 
euphemism, confusion and obfuscation in health policy debates. This 
chapter attempts to give an overview of the empirical patterns of 
development, and unpick some of the conceptual confusions.
Provider plurality and supply side reform before 2010
Until the late 1970s, the most salient English health policy debates 
were electoral bidding competitions about spending on the NHS and 
about the effect of private medical practice on NHS waiting lists. 
Parliament occasionally heard proposals to retract public funding and 
provider ownership at the margins of the NHS, raise prescription and 
other NHS charges, retain ‘amenity’ beds in NHS hospitals (for a fee 
patients could obtain better ‘hotel’ services), and allow consultants 
greater private practice. Mostly these policies had little practical impact 
but served, rather, a symbolic function of preserving the idea of the 
normality and legitimacy of plural provision and private payment 
for healthcare, not least for parts of the Conservative Party and like-
minded pressure groups who were still sceptical about an NHS whose 
efficiency, popularity and indeed existence were living disproof of 
some of their policy, economic and moral principles.
Version 1: Provider plurality
With the Thatcher government (1979) their moment came, but also a 
dilemma. Financially and ideologically (Bacon and Eltis, 1976; Letwin, 
1988), such governments disliked living with the welfare state, but 
electorally they could not live without it (Offe, 1982); Its ‘flagship’, 
the NHS, was too popular for direct attack. As their main intellectual 
foundation, NHS ‘reform’ policies since 1979, including provider 
plurality, have what some orthodox economists call the ‘doctrine of the 
second best’: if one cannot establish a conventional market, the next 
best thing is to establish institutions whose market ‘distortions’, taken 
together, minimise the overall deviation from perfect competition 
(Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). This doctrine suggests the construction 
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of quasi-markets (Enthoven, 1985; Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993) in 
which the state, social insurer or similar body purchases services on 
behalf of the consumer (Allen 2013) and in which plural providers of 
healthcare compete by stimulating innovation, improving healthcare 
quality and/or reducing of healthcare costs. For the NHS, the UK 
government envisaged District Health Authorities (DHAs) and GP 
fundholders purchasing healthcare on behalf of patients, with providers 
competing for contracts and thus for income (Department of Health, 
1989).
From 1991 both these purchasers were allowed to commission non-
NHS providers. Using Waiting List Initiative funds, DHAs could 
purchase private hospital treatment for patients who had been more than 
a year on NHS waiting lists, although these purchases remained only a 
small proportion of NHS in-patient work (see Chapter 12). Few GP 
fundholders commissioned private care for their patients. Economists 
often assume that in order to compete successfully in a quasi-market, 
providers need to take on certain more corporate characteristics: 
greater managerial discretion, provider retention of profits and losses, 
and governance through a Board of Directors (Harding and Preker 
2000). Except for general practices, NHS providers were therefore 
reconstituted as NHS trusts partly on these lines but, importantly, not 
(yet) in respect of profit retention. From 1993 the Department of 
Health also encouraged private–public joint ventures, removing the 
requirement to assess them against a fully NHS-funded alternative 
(NHS internal Executive Letter EL(93)37, issued by the Department of 
Health in London in 1993). Soon after, the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) followed. NHS trusts made turnkey contracts with consortia 
of corporations and private equity firms to plan, finance, build and 
hospitals, and to provide the ancillary services, on-site shops and car 
parking. The trust paid the consortia for these but retained clinical 
budgets, income and management. To financially justify PFI hospital 
schemes sometimes required trusts to under-estimate future caseload 
and over-estimate clinicians’ future productivity, so as to under-estimate 
the required beds (Pollock et al, 1999). The 1996 NHS (Residual 
Liabilities) Act made the Secretary of State for Health guarantor of PFI 
schemes in the NHS (Hellowell, 2014).
When the GPs’ contract with the NHS was revised in 1990, general 
practices were no longer obliged to do their own out-of-hours 
(OOH) work: they could arrange, or pay, for another doctor to do 
so. Corporate deputising services developed as a result, but still more 
did GP cooperatives, some of which later diversified into providing 
medical call-centres and walk-in treatment centres (Sheaff et  al, 
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2012). The 1997 Personal Medical Services (PMS) scheme opened up 
primary medical care to nurse-led providers, corporate and proprietary 
provision. Initially there were few such providers (for instance, there 
were probably fewer than 50 nurse-led general practices) but provider 
plurality had been extended into primary medical care.
Version 2: the Third Way
By 1997 the Labour Party had essentially accepted provider plurality, 
indeed the whole principle of an NHS quasi-market. Labour presented 
its ‘Third Way’ health policies as departing both from some aspects 
of Conservative ‘reforms’ (especially GP fundholding) but also – 
and more significantly for provider plurality – from Bevan’s reliance 
upon nationalised healthcare providers. Nevertheless the Third Way 
was a mixed blessing for provider plurality. PFI ‘Unitary charges’ 
(management fees which an NHS trust paid the PFI consortium) 
were set at 2.5% pa of the project’s capital cost or the rate of inflation 
if higher. From 2004, one change to the NHS contract with GPs 
(the General Medical Services (GMS) contract) was to make general 
practices, not named GPs, the contract signatories so that practices 
could change ownership without jeopardising their NHS contract. 
General practices were also permitted to opt out of OOH work: a 
death-sentence for many cooperatives. Some closed, others converted 
to proprietary or social enterprise status.
Version 3: or rather, version 1 recycled
By 2001 English health ‘reforms’ had become more overtly similar to 
pre-1997 policies, but New Labour took provider plurality further. 
New Labour’s post-2001 reforms were their response to what they 
perceived as the failure of hierarchically-structured NHS providers 
during 1997–2001; and to what they perceived as the specific 
deficiencies of the Conservatives’ internal market of the 1990s, 
particularly regarding motivation and incentives on the supply side. 
Indeed New Labour re-articulated the Conservatives’ objectives for 
the first NHS quasi-market of the 1990s, and the principle of an NHS 
quasi-market itself, as ‘four inter-related pillars of reform … designed 
to embed incentives for continuous and self sustaining improvement’ 
and produce ‘better quality, better patient experience, better value 
for money and reduced inequality’ (Department of Health, 2007b). 
These pillars were: demand side reform; transactional reform; system 
management and regulation; and supply side reform, including ‘more 
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diverse providers with more freedom to innovate and improve services’ 
(Department of Health, 2007b).
Since the coalition and Conservative governments have continued 
most of them, it is worth describing these policies more fully.
1. Demand side reform: Under the ‘Patient Choice’ policy NHS 
patients could select from a range of hospitals, one of which had to 
be independent (Department of Health, 2007a). Under the ‘Any 
Willing Provider’ principle, patients could choose any hospital 
provider accredited by the NHS. Patients were thought likely 
to avoid under-performing hospitals, for whom the prospect of 
losing funding under the cost-per-case Payment by Results pricing 
system (see below) would create incentives to improve quality and 
access times. Real choice, New Labour assumed, would require an 
expansion of provider types and capacity. A similar ‘Any Qualified 
Provider’ policy for community health services (CHS) followed, 
with the aim of improving access to CHS and to allow the entry of 
new providers. Again, patients could choose from a national list of 
approved providers (Jones and Mays, 2013).
2. Transactional reform: a DRG-based system (the ‘health resource 
groups’ (HRG) or ‘tariff’) of fixed prices for procedures, for paying 
both public and independent hospitals was introduced (Department 
of Health, 2007b). Although this cost-per-case system is called 
‘payment-by-results’ (PbR) it is actually payment by activity. The 
idea was to sharpen incentives and competition, with each episode 
of care being reimbursed – if it was not lost to another provider – 
at the national tariff rate, based on average costs. PbR was initially 
designed to cover acute hospitals’ work and has not been expanded 
to community or mental health services, which are still paid for on 
block contracts, in effect fixed budgets (Allen et al, 2014).
3. System management and regulation: Alongside continuing 
hierarchical control by the Department of Health (and since 2013, 
NHS England), the NHS quasi-market was regulated at arm’s length 
by the Cooperation and Competition Panel (CCP) which advised 
the Department of Health in accordance with the Principles and rules 
for cooperation and competition (Department of Health, 2010b). These 
principles required ‘providers and commissioners to cooperate to 
deliver seamless and sustainable care to patients’ and not to make 
‘agreements which restrict commissioner or patient choice against 
patients’ or taxpayers’ interests’. The Care Quality Commission 
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(CQC: formerly the Commission for Health Improvement and 
then the Healthcare Commission) was responsible for inspecting 
both public and independent providers; registering independent 
providers and publishing annual performance ratings for all NHS 
organisations. The other important regulator was (and remains) 
Monitor, the independent regulator of Foundation Trusts. It 
authorised Foundation Trusts and specified borrowing limits, 
ceilings on income from private treatments, the range of goods and 
services that could be supplied, and required financial and statistical 
information (Allen, 2006).
4. Supply side reform: New Labour’s version of the ‘public firm’ 
idea was NHS Foundation Trusts (FTs). Being still state-owned, 
FTs are not independent providers, but are designed to mimic 
aspects of third sector providers by involving local people in their 
governance, and have a degree of managerial autonomy. From 2004 
they were allowed to carry any operating surplus forward to the 
next financial year.
Commissioners were also encouraged to engage with new providers 
from the ‘third sector’ (social economy) including local voluntary 
groups, registered charities, foundations, trusts, non-profit social 
enterprises, and cooperatives (Department of Health, 2006). Finally, 
for profit providers were also encouraged to enter the NHS quasi-
market on a larger scale. A ‘Concordat’ with the private hospital sector 
signalled that the NHS would continue purchasing private hospital 
treatments. Independent sector treatment centres (ISTCs), one per 
PCT, were set up specifically to carry out elective outpatient, day-
patient and low-complexity in-patient surgery on NHS patients 
(House of Commons Health Select Committee, 2006). Initially the 
main providers were corporations: Capio (at least eight contracts), 
Carillon (trading as Clinicenta), Interhealth Canada, Mercury, 
Nations Healthcare, Netcare Healthcare, Partnership Health Group, 
Ramsay, Spire and Health Care UK. Some (but not all) ISTCs were 
subcontracted to their local NHS trust, thereby removing competition 
between those two providers. ISTCs were initially contracted 
nationally but the amount of patients treated has declined in recent 
years (Allen and Jones, 2011). The government also invited United 
Health, a major US health insurer, to pilot nurse-led case management 
of frail older people with frequent unplanned hospital admissions. 
This resulted in the ‘Community Matron’ system, but without further 
corporate involvement.
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liberating the supply side
The current NHS reforms, designed yet again to increase the 
market-like behaviour of providers of care (Department of Health, 
2010a), span the Coalition and current Conservative government. 
The coalition’s Health and Social Care Act (HSCA, 2012) took 
effect in April 2013. It applied competition law explicitly to the 
NHS quasi-market (den Exter and Guy, 2014). As the new economic 
regulator for the whole of the NHS (not only FTs) Monitor acquired 
some functions of the former CCP and, along with the national 
competition authorities (since April 2014, the Competition and 
Markets Authority, or CMA), powers to enforce competition 
law to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and to produce a level 
playing field which places neither public nor private providers at 
any substantial advantage in competing for NHS-funded contracts. 
The NHS Procurement, Choice and Competition Regulations No.  2 
2013 made elements of existing guidance matters for statutory 
regulation, including the PRCC and NHS procurement guidelines, 
and indicated that competitive procurement was to be preferred.
NHS Foundation Trusts were now permitted to obtain up to 49% of 
their income from non-NHS sources (this does not mean to have 49% 
private patients). They could reinvest profits from non-NHS income 
generation to benefit NHS patients (Monitor, n.d.). Each PCT was 
required to make at least three AQP contracts in 2012 (Allen and 
Jones, 2011), and more subsequently. Many of the PFI schemes were 
becoming ruinous for the NHS trusts involved, leading to attempts to 
buy some of the PFI schemes out. The courts ruled, however, that the 
government was exceeding its powers under the 2012 HSCA when it 
tried to spread the costs of the South London Healthcare Trust’s PFI 
schemes (16% of its budget; Hodge, 2013) over nearby NHS trusts 
who had not been party to the schemes.
There have been two important qualifications to these policies. 
Monitor, firstly, is also responsible for promoting co-operation 
(see Chapter 5). It is for NHS commissioners (including Clinical 
Commissioning Groups, or CCGs), however, to ensure that the 
appropriate levels of both competition and cooperation exist in their 
local health economies (HSCA, 2012). Second, NHS England’s Five 
Year Forward View (5YFV), did not mention competition between 
organisations and instead focussed on how organisations in the NHS 
need to cooperate with each other, indeed sometimes merge, for 
example to bring together a range of non-hospital services including 
GPs and CHS, or to integrate acute inpatient with primary care 
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services. In November 2014, the Secretary of State for Health (Jeremy 
Hunt) indicated that he did not think that patient choice (that is, 
competition) was the best way to improve many services (West, 2014). 
Against this, Monitor’s director of cooperation and competition argued 
that competition still had an important role in the NHS (HSJ, 28th 
November, 2014). There having been no relevant legislative changes, 
the HSCA remains in force.
Who was liberated, and what they did when they were
Data on how many non-NHS providers are entering the NHS quasi-
market or their market shares are scarce. The picture – including 
the one below – therefore has to assembled from various discrepant 
sources, reporting different kinds of data (for example, numbers of 
contracts versus numbers of providers versus NHS expenditure on 
different contracts or different kinds of contractor).
With that proviso, it appears that the mix of NHS funded providers 
continued to shift towards non-NHS provision in acute (but non-
emergency) hospital care, out-of-hours primary care, community 
health services and general practice. The providers of mental health 
services and social care were already very diverse. Of the 195 major 
contracts let competitively in 2013/14, 80 went to corporations and 
48 to social enterprises, but the social enterprises’ share was larger 
in cash terms (£690m, versus £490m to corporations) (Iacobucci, 
2013). In 2015 CCGs held an estimated 15166 contracts with ‘non-
NHS’ providers (Centre for Health and the Public Interest, 2015), 
on average about 90 per CCG, although many will be contracts with 
small providers such as small local businesses, charities or individual 
practitioners. The total value was £9.3bn, about 16% of CCG budgets, 
in addition to £0.6bn worth of such contracts made by NHS trusts 
(that is, to private providers as subcontractors to these trusts). These 
figures however must include private sector providers of all kinds, 
many of which are small local providers (for example, local charities, 
proprietary care homes) and all services (not just hospitals, but out-of-
hours services, community health services, mental health provision, 
and so on). From 2006/7 to 2014/15, NHS patients treated by non-
NHS providers rose from around 0.5% (73 000) to 2.6% (471 000) of 
all inpatient episodes (over 18 million in total in 2013/14). In 2014 
corporations were an estimated 59% of the private providers contracted 
to CCGs. Private equity firms backed or owned 58% of those (Centre 
for Health and the Public Interest, 2015).
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Hospitals
Private acute hospitals saw a slow rise (to 6%) in their share of NHS-
funded hospital care, although that 6% represented about a quarter of 
their total income (Davis et al, 2015). The private hospitals receiving 
NHS contracts are mostly corporations, and private provision is 
concentrated in certain specialties. The private proportion is about a 
12.5% share in trauma and orthopaedics (Appleby, 2015), (within this, 
20% is for hip and knee replacements; see Competition Commission, 
2013), rising to 34% in audiology, a very small care group. In outpatient 
care the proportion of non-NHS providers rose from 0.2% (123 000) 
to 5.5% (4.5 million) (Appleby, 2015). These are net increases, though, 
and some ISTCs have closed while others have been absorbed into 
the NHS. Accusations that ISTCs have ‘cherry-picked’ their case-
loads appear unsubstantiated (Chard et al, 2011). Rather, ‘lemon-
dumping’ takes the indirect form of transferring patients who develop 
complications or become unexpectedly ill back to an NHS hospital. 
Since private hospitals generally lack the facilities to treat such patients 
there is an obvious clinical rationale for these transfers. Any ‘cherry 
picking’ occurs by default when hospitals are designed – as ISTCs 
were – only for treating less complex or acutely ill patients: a very 
different service profile to ‘full-service’ NHS hospitals. In an earlier 
period, though, BUPA was alleged (Davis et al, 2015) to have offered 
some categories of cancer, cardiology and gynaecology patients a cash 
payment to seek treatment at NHS rather than BUPA hospitals.
Circle abandoned their management-only contract to run 
Hinchingbrook Hospital as it became unprofitable for them 
(Scourfield, 2016). PFI schemes also became increasingly financially 
problematic for NHS Trusts, on average costing about seven times 
their capital value over the schemes’ lifespan (Davis et al, 2015) and, 
in the meantime, causing unsustainable over-spending in QE Hospital 
Woolwich, Princess Royal Hospital Orpington, Derby Hospitals and 
elsewhere. These problems have arisen when inflation has been low, 
and interest rates exceptionally low, by historical standards.
Evidence about service quality under plural provision is mixed. 
Two scientific and one ‘grey’ study each suggest little difference in 
the outcomes of NHS and ISTC treatment of NHS patients for 
cataract extraction, inguinal hernia repair, hip replacement, knee 
replacement and varicose vein surgery (Chard et al, 2011; Competition 
Commission, 2013). Earlier, Oussedik and Haddad (2009) found that 
ISTCs had higher rates of post-operative problems for hip and knee 
replacements, although the difference may partly reflect treatment away 
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from the patient’s locality of residence rather than provider ownership. 
Allowing for patients’ pre-operative characteristics, ISTCs produced a 
slightly greater restoration of function after cataract extraction or hip 
replacement patients than NHS providers did, slightly less for hernia 
repairs, and no difference for two other treatments. ISTC patients also 
tended to be healthier, younger and thinner (Browne et al, 2008), 
however, and tended to be referred for less severe conditions (Chard 
et al, 2011). An explanation of these mixed findings appears to be that 
hospital ownership does not in itself affect the level of quality of the 
average NHS-funded patient’s reported experience. The differences 
are instead entirely attributable to patient characteristics, case-mix 
differences and unobserved characteristics particular to individual 
hospitals (Perotin et  al, 2013). At least two NHS contracts with 
corporate providers have been terminated for patient safety reasons 
(Clinicenta, Lister Hospital Stevenage, 2013; mobile ophthalmology 
services at Musgrove Park, Taunton, 2014. See Dyer, 2014). A study 
by Cooper et al, (2011), sometimes irrelevantly cited in this context, 
reports the effects of competition on in-patient mortality, and not the 
effects of diverse, still less corporate, hospital ownership.
Community Health and Out-of-Hours Services
Data by which to compare NHS and non-NHS providers are even 
more lacking for community health services (CHS). Attempts to 
convert NHS trusts to social enterprises have been concentrated in 
mental and community health services. NHS pay and conditions were 
guaranteed for existing staff but not for new staff, making NHS staff 
reluctant to exercise their ‘right to request’ the transfer (Sheaff et al, 
2012). Corporate provision of CHS increased from almost nothing 
in 2010 to a position where corporations, especially Virgin Care, 
have won some large NHS contracts. In contrast SERCO withdrew 
altogether from providing NHS-funded clinical services after making 
multimillion pound losses on them. Similarly, non-NHS providers 
withdrew from bidding for CHS services in Cambridge, BUPA 
pulled out of contract negotiations for West Sussex MSK services 
(Ryan, 2015), and Peninsula Community Interest Company (a social 
enterprise) refused to re-bid for the mental health services in Cornwall 
which it had previously provided. By no means universal to begin 
with, CCGs’ use of AQP contracts stagnated from 2013 (Williams, 
2014) at about 130 registered providers, usually small to medium sized 
firms (BMA, 2013), with the largest numbers providing diagnostic 
and adult hearing services. By 2014 the NHS was also spending about 
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£3 billion a year to buy (mostly) CHS or health-related social care 
from local authorities and charities (Iacobucci, 2014).
In out of hours (OOH) services, by 2015 about 51% of the non 
general practice providers (44/86) were social enterprises (not for 
profit organisations), 24% (21/86) corporate and the same number 
NHS providers(Warren et al, 2015).
Without bespoke research it is difficult to ascertain the consequences 
of plural provision for CHS. Existing published data are nugatory 
and the fuller data-sets, promised for 2015, have yet to be published. 
The available evidence therefore comes mostly from media reports: a 
probably biased sample.
Two widely-known reports paint contrasting pictures. The CQC 
investigation of staff abusing residents with learning difficulties at 
Winterbourne View (then owned by Castlebeck Care) attributed 
these problems to inadequate staffing levels and poor care planning. 
NHS England subsequently announced ‘closure or reform of up to 49 
private hospitals that provide long-term accommodation for people 
with learning disabilities or autism whose behaviour is considered 
challenging’ (Anon, 2016) and a reduction of referrals to private 
providers. The last large-scale NHS provider of such services (with no 
allegations of criminal abuse) also closed (Brindle, 2015). In contrast 
Circle, coordinating some local general practices (but not Bedford 
Hospital Trust, which refused Circle’s contract offer) in providing 
‘integrated’ MSK services in Bedfordshire, were claiming to be triaging 
all patients within 24 hours of referral, to have diverted about a fifth 
of GP referrals to ‘more appropriate’ clinicians, and reduced diagnostic 
and physiotherapy waits: ‘All of this for a flat fee, instead of ever rising 
spending’ (MSK spokesman, reported in Smith (2015)).
Patient informants for the 2012 GP survey evaluated NHS and 
social enterprise out-of-hours services providers similarly in respect 
of timeliness of care, confidence in the clinician they saw, and overall 
experience of the service. Corporate providers were evaluated lower 
(‘moderate’ to ‘large’ differences) on all three outcomes (Warren 
et  al, 2015). Commercial providers saw fewer OOH cases per 
head of population than other providers (NAO, 2014). A CQC 
investigation into a patient’s death in 2008 revealed that the company 
responsible, Take Care Now, was prone to under-staffing and had weak 
arrangements for managing patient safety, especially considering its 
heavy use of locum doctors from other European countries. Similar 
complaints – although no patient deaths – were also reported for 
SERCO’s out-of-hours services in Cornwall, and sharp practice in 
reporting monitoring data (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2013).
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General Practice
Under the Alternative Provider Medical Services (APMS) scheme, 
new general practice providers included companies, social enterprises, 
mutuals, ‘groups of existing GPs’ (Coleman et al, 2013) and joint bids 
from Foundation Trusts with out-of-hours care providers, and from 
private companies with local general practices. Many private primary 
medical care companies have developed, often partly or wholly GP-
owned. A FOI enquiry showed that 23% of GP members of CCGs 
had a financial stake in a company providing services (though not 
always primary medical services) to that same CCG (Kaffash, 2013). 
Virgin ended its partnerships with GPs to prevent this apparent 
conflict of interest. Often badged as GP-led, the more expansive GP-
owned companies (for example, Chilvers McCrea Healthcare, DMC 
Healthcare) had initially won contracts in their local area, and from 
that basis began winning contracts elsewhere.
Recently large federations of general practices have formed in 
Northamptonshire, Birmingham, London and elsewhere. Some have 
added a social enterprise or a looser confederal body as network 
coordinating body. The federating general practices usually seek 
economies of scale in management, and some economies of scope 
in their more specialised clinical services, sharing resources without 
changing GPs’ ownership and management of the practices. A few 
professional partnership general practices have been taken over by 
NHS trusts, however (for example, in southern Hampshire; Bostock, 
2015).
Doctors’ everyday work practices under the APMS contractors 
appear similar to those in traditional professional partnerships in terms 
of the division of clinical labour and focus on meeting QOF targets 
(Coleman et al, 2013). Competition also stimulated at least some ‘bad 
behaviour’ on the part of existing providers:
‘In Site 1 there were allegations by APPCs that other practices 
had removed signage and misdirected patients. In Site 2 there were 
suggestions that staff at a minor injuries service which shared premises 
with an APPC practice had deliberately misdirected patients away from 
the APPC’ (Coleman et al, 2013).
Again, corporate and proprietary providers would relinquish 
unprofitable contracts. UHE withdrew from providing NHS-funded 
primary medical care altogether, and The Practice withdrew from 
particular contracts (for example, Woking, Leicester, Nottingham). 
NHS England selected 21 providers to take over at need struggling 
general practices in southern England. The 21 include NHS 
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
page 223
223
Provider plurality and supply-side reform
Foundation Trusts, large merged general practices (‘super-practices’), 
GP federations, out-of-hours co-operatives, Virgin Care, social 
enterprises and smaller private companies (Pulse 10th July, 2015).
An unstable quasi-market
The set of NHS contracts which private providers hold is in constant 
flux, often over short periods. Contracts for, say, OOH services or 
planned orthopaedic surgery have shifted between GP cooperatives, 
NHS trusts and corporate providers (and occasionally back again). Also, 
the ownership of corporate and proprietary and, to a lesser extent, 
social enterprise providers has been a succession of mergers, closures, 
acquisitions and re-naming. For example Virgin acquired and re-named 
Assura Medical 2010 (except for its property management business, 
but including Assura’s 50% share in a number of general practices) 
and, in effect, took over a social enterprise providing CHS. Ramsay 
acquired Capio UK and its hospitals, day surgery providers and two 
neurological rehabilitation homes (2007). The Practice took over 30 
GP surgeries from Chilvers McCrea, six from United Health and two 
secure immigration centre clinics from Drummond; and so on.
Despite the aims of competition policy, the NHS quasi-market is 
not a completely level playing field. On balance, private (especially 
corporate and proprietary) providers have in certain respects enjoyed 
less scrutiny and greater freedom of action than NHS providers. 
Freedom of Information requirements do not apply to non-NHS 
providers. Private providers can (and do) withdraw from financially 
damaging contracts, and transfer complex patients away. NHS trusts 
cannot. Private providers often structure themselves into separate 
operating and property-holding companies, as a means of converting 
profits from NHS contracts into interest payments or other ostensible 
‘costs’ which they can then transfer more readily to other recipients 
(for example, holding companies), and may use off-shore status to 
reduce their tax payments. The playing-field has also been ‘levelled’ by 
limiting NHS providers’ access to capital, so that NHS providers can 
only raise capital through PFI schemes (but see above) or from retained 
profits, open financial markets or Department of Health loans which 
follow ‘generally accepted principles used by financial institutions’ 
(Department of Health, 2014).
Against this, NHS providers are electorally ‘too big to fail’. Monitor 
has allowed a number of NHS trusts and foundation trusts to continue 
operating despite being in evident financial difficulty (den Exter 
and Guy, 2014) (the combined deficits of all NHS trusts and NHS 
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foundation trusts being above £500m at the end of 2015). Department 
of Health loans also cover these circumstances.
Trial, error and exit
For non-NHS providers the coalition government was a period of 
uncertainty, trial and error as they learned by experience which NHS-
funded services they could and could not provide profitably. When it 
is easier for firms to leave a market than for new ones to enter it (for 
example, because of investment, ‘first mover’ or regulatory barriers 
to entry), a common effect of competition is market concentration 
on the supply side. Despite what competition legislation (which now 
applies to the NHS) may intend, seven private providers now have 
88% of the independent provider market for NHS-funded inpatient 
work (Appleby, 2015).
Certain private providers found it hard to undercut NHS providers’ 
costs and still turn a profit, as noted above. Since about two-thirds 
of the cost of healthcare is labour (see Chapters 3 and 13), reducing 
the use of expensive, that is, clinicians’, labour is the main way of 
reducing costs (hence extracting profits) once the level of income from 
a contract is determined. This may explain the pattern of low staffing 
levels in some corporate and proprietary providers, of which Serco’s 
out-of-hours service in Cornwall was the most publicised example 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2013). Facing the same cost 
patterns, however, NHS services are also understaffed at times (Mid 
Stafford Hospital being the notorious NHS example, see Healthcare 
Commission, 2009).
the fog of policy
The above patterns highlight several conceptual distinctions with 
policy implications.
Corporate versus private
Occasionally policy-makers themselves distinguish the different kinds 
of ‘private’ provision, although sometimes only to advocate one kind 
of private provider by appeal to another kind (for example, ‘GPs are 
private providers so what is wrong with corporations providing hospital 
services to the NHS?’). Failure to distinguish leads to overlooking an 
important health policy scenario somewhat different from that of the 
NHS purchasing from healthcare corporations. The alternative scenario 
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
page 225
225
Provider plurality and supply-side reform
is one of competing public providers, social enterprises, charities 
and professional partnerships, but without corporate or proprietary 
providers. It raises the theoretical question of whether competition 
between public firms (or between social enterprises, or between 
professional partnerships) would have different loci (for example, 
speed of access rather than service quality) and consequences than 
competition between corporations. It also raises the policy question of 
whether the alleged adverse effects of corporate provision (Davis et al, 
2015) can be avoided whilst retaining an element of private provision 
enabling the introduction of new models of care for NHS patients (for 
example, hospice care, which originated in the charitable sector).
Competition versus privatisation:
Advocates and opponents of provider plurality both usually equate 
‘competition’ with privatisation, demonstrating euphemistic or lax 
thinking respectively. This failure to distinguish leads to overlooking 
another important health policy scenario, in which only public 
providers would compete for patient referrals and NHS contracts. 
Then provider competition would occur, without any provider 
plurality. There is some (Cooper et al, 2011; Gaynor et al, 2012) – 
though contested (Pollock et al, 2011) – evidence that competition 
between predominantly NHS providers may reduce hospital mortality 
for acute myocardial infarction patients. If so, competition between 
NHS providers produces at least some of the benefits of competition 
whilst non-NHS providers play a marginal role. US evidence also 
suggests that it is competition, not ownership, which affects provider 
behaviour (Allen, 2009).
The NHS contains two different structures for provider competition.
1. Competition for patients (‘competition in the market’), that is, to 
attract self- and GP referrals, each referral triggering a payment to 
the provider. In this structure, plural providers can permanently 
coexist and compete in each local health economy.
2. Competition for contracts, (‘competition for the market’, ‘managed 
competition’; Saltman and von Otter, 1992) under which providers 
compete for a usually time limited local monopoly to provide a 
service or groups of services. If a private provider wins, the result 
may be private provision without further competition.
Even if plural provision were necessary (which it is not: see above), 
it is also insufficient to stimulate provider competition for patients. 
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Supposing GPs abandoned their professional dislike of competing for 
patients, they would still have neither need nor reason to compete 
wherever the demand for general practice services exceeds the supply 
(that is, almost everywhere). The price of provider competition is an 
excess of supply over demand, or for the NHS over healthcare needs, 
irrespective of provider ownership (Dawson, 1994).
Policy messes
‘Policy messes’ arise when implementing one policy obstructs 
implementation of another (Winetrobe, 1992). Provider plurality 
seems to cause at least three.
Plural Provision versus Austerity:
Both Labour and the Coalition government responded to the 2008 
financial market crash by cutting public expenditure, including NHS 
spending in real-terms, if not cash. At present (early 2016) NHS 
England and Monitor are proposing to reduce tariff prices by 7% 
overall and more than 10% for some orthopaedics work, a change 
predicted (Anon, 2015) to reduce private orthopaedics hospitals’ 
income by 7% in 2016/17. As also noted above, private providers tend 
to withdraw from bidding for, or even keeping, unprofitable NHS 
contracts. Austerity seems to force governments to choose between 
cost containment and provider plurality.
Plural Provision versus Integrated Care:
Treating patients with multiple chronic conditions effectively 
requires combining separate clinical or therapeutic activities, often 
undertaken by different providers, into a coherent ‘integrated’ 
sequence of activities across often different settings (see Chapter 9). 
The more providers are involved, the more organisational interfaces 
these patients’ care has to be coordinated across, and the harder it 
becomes to achieve the continuities of care (Sheaff et al, 2015). This 
is an argument for of having general practice, community health 
services and perhaps community hospital services provided by a 
single organisation rather than having a greater plurality of providers 
in each locality. The Five Year Forward View tacitly takes the point 
and opts for integrated care.
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Plural Provision versus Political Accountability:
Supporters and opponents of plural provision respectively tend to 
assume that provider plurality will markedly improve or worsen the 
accessibility, provision, development or cost of NHS-funded services. 
Central regulation and mandated local commissioning practices may 
so tightly constrain all providers, however, that their ownership makes 
little difference to these policy outcomes. Evidence based medicine 
and professional bodies’ disciplinary influence are equally agnostic 
about provider ownership (Andersen, 2009). In those circumstances 
the only coherent rationales for plural provision would be ideological 
or to satisfy vested interests outside the health sector. (Davis et al, 2015, 
report the numbers of Conservative – and other parties’ – MPs with 
financial interests in private healthcare provision.)
Dismantling the nhs?
Current English health policy is therefore rather ambivalent, even 
incoherent, about plural provision. Plural provision would reinstate 
a contemporary version of pre-NHS healthcare supply patterns, as 
persist in many Bismarckian health systems (particularly Germany) and 
– more problematically – the USA. The logical conclusion, perhaps 
in some minds also the aim, of the policy is to reduce the NHS itself 
to a financing and quality-certification, strategic planning and service 
coordination (‘commissioning’) agency exercising governance over 
mostly independent providers. A standard riposte is that the NHS 
was established to guarantee patients’ access to needed healthcare free 
of charge; provider ownership doesn’t matter if the quality and cost 
of NHS services are good (Appleby, 2015). Provider plurality might 
make a difference in precisely these terms, though, and it remains to 
be shown whether it is for the better. Otherwise, what is the health 
gain from provider plurality?
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